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Mikhail Gorbachev has proclaimed a new military doctrine of reliance on high
quality military manpower, military hardware and military science instead of their quantity.
This doctrine is of great importance to the Soviet navy, which is experiencing serious
problems with the quality of its men and hardware in the aftermath of the great quantitative
(as well as qualitative) expansion of the 1960s- 1980s.
The career of naval officer has lost much of its prestige because of the general
decline in prestige of the Soviet military and because of sharply deteriorating standards of
living among officers, especially the junior ones. One quarter of navy families have no
government-assigned residences and have to rent rooms at exorbitant black-market rates,
while another quarter live in what the Soviets consider sub-standard housing. Many
officers opt for shore rather than sea duty to take care of their families because the navy fails
to do it. Sea duty is less and less appealing to officers because excellence in sea duty by no
means guarantees career advancement; conducting intrigue ashore is more likely to bring
promotion. It is no surprise that it is primarily the young officers, whose standard of living
is especially low, and whose career prospects are dim, who are resigning from active duty.
Naval service has become particularly unpopular among the enlisted conscripts
because of its length—three years compared to two in the other services. Some young men
try to avoid being conscripted into the navy; parents of others protest their children's 3-year
naval service as "unfair." The conditions of naval service, despite the improved habitability
of new Soviet ships, leave much to be desired, even in such a basic matter as food; an
American serviceman's daily ration includes 2.5 times more meat and meat products, 2
times more fruit and vegetables, 6 times more eggs-and 3 times less bread than that of his
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Soviet counterpart. What makes things worse is that the official rations too often remain on
paper.
In the past, the Soviet navy succeeded in picking the best of the conscripts - mostly
Slavs, politically reliable and reasonably technically proficient, with a sprinkling of lower
quality conscripts from Central Asia and Transcaucasia. In the 1980s, this situation has
changed for the worse because of demographic factors. Today 37 percent of all conscripts
are drawn from Central Asia and Transcaucasia, a sharp increase from 28 percent as recently
as 1980. While the navy now has no choice but to accept substantial numbers of lower-
rated non-Slavic conscripts who frequently have a very poor knowledge of Russian, it has
discovered that it is unprepared to deal effectively with the nationalities' problems and
conflicts as they increasingly find their way from the civilian life into the life of ship crews.
In response to these problems, Soviet navy C-in-C ADM Chernavin has proposed a
shift to an all-volunteer navy, a position sharply different from the views of the non-naval
members of the Soviet High Command. There has been no positive response so far to
Chernavin's proposal. The issue, however, will have to be addressed in the near future,
because the Ministry of Defense is planning to curtail the term of conscription to the navy
down to two years from the current three—and Chernavin says that the Soviet navy will not
be able to operate if they must rely on enlisted men with no more than two years of
experience.
Officer education suffers from economic constraints and lack of modem technology
(such as a severe shortage of computers). Training and exercises continue to suffer from
lack of realism, excessive caution and resulting oversimplification. The navy, relying on its
experiences of the Persian Gulf convoys, is planning changes in these old patterns towards
greater independence of ship and groups of ships' commanders, but psychological and
organizational obstacles to such a change are considerable. There is also a good reason for
constraining independence of commanding officers: while technology is becoming
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increasingly complex, many commanding officers are young, with 33 to 34 year-old
officers in command of major ships not being exceptional cases.
While new Soviet weapons and weapons systems have, as the Soviets themselves
say, "unquestionably high tactical-technical characteristics," their reliability remains a source
of special concern for the navy. In the relatively recent past, adequate quality of hardware
for the navy was achieved thanks to the navy's ability to pressure the shipbuilding and other
defense industries into fulfilling the navy's requirements. This system no longer works.
During the Brezhnev years, when bureaucratic agencies were allowed to pursue their self-
interest, the navy has lost much of its ability to enforce quality in the shipbuilding industry.
The state commission which investigated the April 1989 MIKE submarine sinking has
concluded that the submarine's acceptance tests suffered from "impermissible liberalism,"
and that in the future the system of acceptance tests should be made more strict. The Soviets
also propose to reduce the number of classes of ships and of ships built, and to use the
released resources for improving the quality of equipment. This approach is fully
compatible with Gorbachev's doctrine of quality rather than quantity, with Soviet unilateral
cuts of older ships, and with Soviet pressure for conventional arms control with the United
States.
The most obvious way out of the current problems with manpower and materiel is
to reduce the number of men and ships in the Soviet navy. The ongoing cuts of older ships
and personnel confirm that the Soviets understand this. Further cuts would allow the
Soviets to improve the condition of their naval officer corps, to find either enough good
conscripts for the navy or pay to volunteers to enlist, and to build, to use Lenin's old
formula, "fewer, but better" ships—provided that a certain minimum of political and
economic stability is preserved in the Soviet Union in the near to mid-term future.
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1. 0. INTRODUCTION.
1. 1 . Gorbachev's Military Doctrine.
Aspects of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's proclaimed new military doctrine
such as "reasonable sufficiency" and "defensive strategy" are receiving considerable
attention from Western observers,. At the same time, relatively less attention is being paid
to another facet of this doctrine: the transition from quantity to quality in providing for the
defense needs of the Soviet Union, announced by Gorbachev at the XDC Communist Party
Conference in June 1988, which has become a turning point for the policies of perestroika.
From now on, the Soviet leader stated, the security of the USSR would rely not on
quantitative factors, but on high quality of military manpower, military hardware
and military science. 1
This change has a special significance for the Soviet navy (Voenno-morskoy flot —
VMF), which is in the process of ridding itself of old "low-tech" ships and of adopting
some of the most advanced pieces of naval technology built anywhere. The accidents that
have recently plagued the VMF, from the explosion of the ammunition depot at
Severomorsk to the MIKE disaster in April 1989, have clearly demonstrated the importance
of flawless human performance in operating costly modern naval technology. This study
focuses on the problems of providing high quality manpower, both enlisted and
commissioned, for today's and tomorrow's "hi-tech" VMF. Glasnost' (openness) has
made it worthwhile to study VMF through published Soviet sources.
lnO khode realizatsii resheniy XXVII s'ezda KPSS i zadachakh po uglubleniiyu perestroyki," Kommunist .
1988, no. 10, p. 67.
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1. 2. Research Goals.
This study will explore several topics. The professional self-esteem of
commissioned officers is important for a successful transition to a "hi-tech" VMF. Essential
for achieving professional pride are adequately high social status of officers, their perception
that their service is appreciated and adequately rewarded by the society, their belief that they
are treated fairly by their superiors, and that their promotions are based on merit. Of equal
importance are education and training, an ability to work with modem technology and
officers' confidence in this technology. The quality of conscripts in the ranks of VMF,
their attitude to naval duty and the conditions of their service and training determine their
technological proficiency.
2.0. COMMISSIONED OFFICERS
2. 1. The Question of Prestige.
The VMF has always stood out among the other services of the Soviet Armed
Forces (Vooruzhennye Sily—VS) by virtue of its extensive use of relatively advanced
technologies, requiring more sophisticated and cultured officers and men than the Ground
Forces, its somewhat exotic (for a landlocked country) seafaring character, and even its
black uniforms, elegant and unusual compared to the drab khakis of the rest of the VS. 2 In
the 1980s VMF has added one more crucial difference: unlike the Ground Forces and
elements of the Air Force (Voenno-vozdushnye sily—WS), VMF has been unscathed by
the war in Afghanistan, with its massive show of brutality towards the Afghan civilians and
2See Robert Bathurst, Michael Burger, Ellen Wolffe, The Soviet Sailor: Combat Readiness and Morale,
KFR 383-82 (Arlington, VA: Ketron, Inc., 30 June 1982), passim.
'
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the Soviet enlisted men, incompetence only diluted by sporadic strong performance by the
special forces, and the final disgrace of a defeat at the hands of a technologically vastly
inferior opponent.
A combination of changing social values and harsh economic realities, however, has
been reducing the prestige of a career as a naval officer. The government is no longer able
to adequately reward naval officers for their difficult jobs. During Leonid Brezhnev's reign
(1964-1982), the salaries of military officers grew very little, reflecting the general tendency
of Brezhnev's regime to increase the incomes of unskilled and semi-skilled labor at the
expense of skilled professionals. Even more important than salary are the perks provided
by one's employer. Naval officers and their families, frequently living on isolated VMF
bases, are totally dependent on VMF for such essentials as housing, medical care, child
care, schools, etc., and they have not been spared by the current consumer crisis.
2. 2. The Housing Crunch.
Housing has been a particularly painful issue. The size of the VMF is estimated to be
437,000 men, of whom 77,000 are commissioned and non-commissioned officers.3 (The
enlisted men, who in the absolute majority of cases do not yet have families or are not
allowed to take their families to their place of service, have no housing problems.) As of
January 1, 1989, the VMF officially listed 19,220, or approximately 25 per cent of navy
families as having no government-assigned residence (beskvartirnye), another
19,362 families, or about 25 per cent as having inadequate housing (which means
extremely overcrowded conditions without basic conveniences), and 866 families, or about
3The Military Balance 1989-1990 (London: the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1989), p. 35.
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1 per cent, as living in condemned buildings.4 The reality is probably even worse than the
percentages above, because a minority of officers do not have families and live in
dormitories. Many officers with families have to rent rooms at exorbitant black market
rates, and feel humiliated by the experience.5
Glasnost' has spread the word of abuses resulting from shortage of housing for
VMF officers. Consider a case recently publicized by the government daily Izvestiya: a
young wife and a baby of a navy officer at the Black Sea Fleet base in Sevastopol were
thrown out of their rented room in the middle of the night. With her husband at sea, she
tried in vain to find help from the Communist Party committee of the city. When she
refused to leave the party offices, a scuffle developed, after which she was arrested and
beaten at a police station, her child was taken away and put for a day in a hospital, and she
was fined for "hooliganism"! 6 Incidents like this hardly contribute to the allure of naval
officer's career.
2.3. The Service Hardship and the Issue of Fairness.
The Soviets recognize the special difficulties faced by naval personnel. Even as
living conditions have improved substantially on new Soviet ships, the hardship of service,
according to VMF C-in-C Fleet Admiral V. N. Chernavin, has remained:
Combat work goes on constantly day in day out, week in
week out. Watch—short rest—again watch. Living space is
limited. The monotony and uniformity are tiring. Hearts
long for home, relatives and loved ones. Yet very high
4First Deputy C-in-C of VMF Fleet Admiral I. Kapitanets, "Kak razvivat'sya flotu?" Krasnaya zvezda,
August 15, 1989.
5Captain 2nd Rank S. Turchenko, "Yest' u akademii i takie zaboty," Krasnaya zvezda . October 13, 1988.
6N. Sautin, "Ch'ya chest' zadeta?" Izvestiya, October 14, 1988.
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vigilance and complete mobilization of forces—spiritual and
physical—are required of a seaman.7
2. 3. 1. Avoiding Sea Duty.
The combination of sea duty hardships with dire shortages of housing and other
amenities, as well as with a promotion system riddled with favoritism, have created among
the Soviet naval officers a true syndrome of "being there," that is, ashore. A journalist
interviewing Fleet Admiral Chernavin, asked:
"Shipboard" officers talked to me sadly about the fact that
service is easier for the "landlubbers" and—this is what is
shameful-life in general is better. They were talking about
distribution of housing, travel vouchers, places in creches
and kindergartens, and service promotions. Are the
complaints justified?
Chernavin agreed:
They are to a large extent justified. An alarming trend
emerged at one point: reports began to come from
young officers requesting a transfer from ship to
shore. ... Now the situation is gradually being rectified. 8
[Emphasis added.]
As the experience of Soviet escort ships in the Persian Gulf has shown, excellence
in sea duty by no means guarantees career advancement for skippers and their
officers. Frequently the opposite is true: upon return to port from Persian gulf, a ship
is subjected to a hostile inspection resulting in revocation of proposed awards for the
7D. Mysyakov, "Clear Channel," Komsomol'skaya pravda, February 21, 1988," translated in FBIS-Soviet
Union, February 25, 1988, p. 72.
8Ibid.
- 9 - Tsypkin
skipper and his men.9 Apparently the "landlubbers," who make careers by "being there,"
see officers who performed well under conditions close to combat as a threat and
successfully intrigue against them. Such attitudes would impede promotion of officers with
combat experience, a loss for the VMF.
2. 4. The Impact of Cuts.
The officers' morale is being sapped further by personnel cuts initiated by
Gorbachev. While older ships are sold for scrap, officers worry about their future. 10 The
Ministry of Defense has stated it would discharge primarily those overage and unfit for
service, and help the discharged and retired officers with housing and jobs. 11 But lack of
job placement and counselling services and growing unemployment, as well as an extreme
shortage of housing are making the process excruciatingly painful.
Meanwhile, navy officers have been allowed to resign their commissions (normally
only poor health is grounds for doing so), and it is primarily the younger officers who
are resigning in large numbers: they have less to lose in the navy, and more to gain in
the civilian economy (for instance, by joining a "cooperative" producing consumer goods
where the income can easily be five to ten times higher than that of a junior officer).
2. 5. An Attempt to Resurrect Russian Imperial Traditions.
^Captain 2nd Rank S. Turchenko, Captain 3rd Rank V. Pasyakin, "Bol'shie nepriyatnosti v rodnoy baze,"
Krasnaya zvezda, March 3, 1989.
10Kapitanets, "Kak razvivat'sya flotu?" G. Kostev, "K novomu urovnyu kachestva," ("Towards a new level
of quality."), Krasnaya zvezda, January 29, 1989.
^Lt. Colonel S. Levitskiy, "O rabote s kadrami v period predstoyashchego sokrashcheniya Vooruzhennykh
Sil SSSR," ("On work with personnel at the time of forthcoming cuts in the Soviet Armed Forces."),
Krasnaya zvezda, February 11, 1989; Major I. Ivanyuk, "Dlya tekh, kto ukhodit v zapas," ("For those who
are discharged."), Krasnaya zvezda, April 15, 1989.
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In an experimental attempt to bolster morale the navy command is attempting to
replace the increasingly disgraced and impotent communist party organizations with the
traditional institution of the military in Imperial Russia, the "officer' societies". This policy
follows the pattern of Gorbachev's other policies, encouraging restoration of traditional
Russian values and institutions in order to keep the society together, something that the
exhausted communist ideology can no longer do. In pre- 19 17 Russia officers' societies
maintained standards of conduct and honor and fostered camaraderie among the
commissioned officers of a ship. It is hoped that new officers' societies will do the same
for VMF, as well as provide a mechanism for settling amicably the unending squabbles
which are rampant in the Soviet military in general and the navy in particular. 12
The Soviet and Russian military tradition, however, works against the officers'
societies' speedy success. Their success was limited in the Imperial Russia because the
bureaucratic-organizational logic turned out to be stronger than the caste spirit of the
military. 13 Emergence of a true sense of professional pride among officers has
been prevented by constant, petty political interference and distrust manifested in the
existence of the institute of political officers. The officers' sense of camaraderie and honor
has been severely undermined by the KGB involving officers in spying on each other.
12Captain 1st Rank N Remizov (Ret.), "Kamerton chesti," ("Tuning fork of honor."), Krasnaya zvezda,
April 7, 1989.
13For an excellent analysis of this and other problems of the Imperial Russian military, see William C.
Fuller, Jr., Civil-Military conflict in Imperial Russia 1881-1914 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1985), pp. 22, 23.
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3. 0. THE ENLISTED MEN.
The Soviet navy is experiencing serious difficulties in obtaining enlisted men of
adequate quality, in providing them with basic necessities and with solving ethnic problems
among them.
3. 1. Protest Against the Length of Conscription
The enlisted men are concerned not only about the hardship of naval service, but
primarily about the greater length of conscription in the VMF compared to the other services
(3 years rather than 2). At a time when the general appeal of military service has been
reduced, "the ages-old romantic appeal of naval service no longer compensates in the eyes
of a multitude of young men and their parents for the 'loss' of the third year." As a result,
in order to avoid service in VMF, about 0. 1 per cent of all conscripts dispatched to the
Northern Fleet, feign drug and alcohol addictions (and another 0.1 per cent are real
addicts). 14 The VMF command apparently recognized some time ago the unpopularity of
three-year conscription. In early 1988, Fleet Admiral Chernavin, while defending the three-
year term of naval conscription as necessary because of the complexity of naval equipment,
suggested as the only solution offering "real benefits to seamen." 15 (See below.)
14Lt. Captain A. Lobskiy, "Pochemu na flote sluzhat dol'she?" Krasnaya zvezda, July 9, 1989.
15D. Mysyakov, "Clear Channel," p. 72.
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3.2. Quality of Food.
In the past, the VMF generally managed to feed their personnel better than the
Ground Forces did. 16 As the food situation in the Soviet Union deteriorated in the 1980s,
the quality of food throughout the VS declined, and the VMF has apparently lost whatever
edge it used to have. Despite the fact that new improved food rations for enlisted men were
announced during the celebrations of the 70th anniversary of the VS, 17 little improvement
has been seen. In theory, a Soviet soldier's daily ration of 4,145 calories includes .850 kg
of bread, of which .400 kg is made of top grade wheat grain, .175 kg of meat, .820 kg of
potatoes and unspecified vegetables, .030 kg of butter, .020 kg of vegetable oil, .070 kg of
sugar, .125 kg of cereals, and .040 kg of macaroni. On holidays and Sundays a soldier is
supposed to get two eggs. A seaman gets .200 kg more of meat and less cereal. The
Soviets point out that their theoretical caloric intake is higher than that in the U.S. Armed
Forces (which the Soviets consider to be 4,000 calories), but note that an American
serviceman's daily ration includes 2.5 times more meat and meat products, 2
times more fruit and vegetables, 6 times more eggs-and 3 times less bread than
that of his Soviet counterpart. 18
What makes things much worse is that official rations too often remain on
paper in the VMF. The situation in Black Sea Fleet and the even more important Northern
Fleet is cited as "especially troubling." Commanding officers tend to overlook theft of food
meant for servicemen; there is a shortage of refrigerators and other equipment; in addition,
VMF ship cooks are notorious for their poor skills. As a result, sailors frequently have
nothing but canned food to eat; when crews get tired of the traditional staple of the Russian
military establishment—gruel, all cooking simply stops, because the cooks do not know
16Bathurst et al., The Soviet Sailor: Combat Readiness and Morale, pp. 56, 57.
17Army General D. T. Yazov, 70 let na strazhe sotsializma," Krasnaya zvezda, February 21, 1988.
18Col. L. Nechaev, "Chto na soldatskom stole," (Interview with Deputy Minister of Defense, Commander
of the VS Rear Services Army General V. Arkhipov), Krasnaya zvezda, April 14, 1989.
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how to prepare any other meals! Seamen from Central Asia and Transcaucasia, whose
numbers of in the VMF are on the rise, particularly suffer: they are not used to Russian
gruel and frequently refuse to eat it at all. While on paper the military cooks should be
offering 18 first courses for dinner, in reality not more than 2 or 3 are offered; out of 52
possible second courses, only 4 or 5 are ever prepared. 19
3. 3. The Ethnic Problems.
In the past, the VMF succeeded in picking the better of the conscripts: mostly
Slavs, politically reliable and reasonably technical proficient, with a sprinkling of lower
quality conscripts from Central Asia and Transcaucasia.20 In the 1980s, this situation has
changed for the worse because of demographic factors. Today 37 percent of all
conscripts are drawn from Central Asia and Transcaucasia, a sharp increase
from 28 percent as recently as in 1980.21 Not only the technical skills of conscripts
from these areas are below the average Soviet standard (the result of a poor educational
system there), but training these conscripts is significantly complicated by their poor
proficiency in Russian, the official language of the armed forces. According to Minister of
Defense Army General Dmitriy Yazov, in 1988 there were more than 125,000 conscripts
with no Russian, 12 times more than 20 years ago; personnel in military districts comprise
90-95 ethnic groups, in divisions — 40-50, in units and ships—up to 30.22
The number of Kirghiz conscripts in the Baltic fleet has increased four-fold between
1980 and 1988; if several years ago submarine crews in that fleet included conscripts of no
19Ibid.; Captain 3rd Rank P. Ishchenko, "Kholodil'nik v ... blindazhe," Krasnaya zvezda, August 16, 1989.
20Bathurst et al., The Soviet Sailor: Combat Readiness and Morale, pp. 44, 45.
21
"...But Problems Remain. On "Regional Cliques' And the Russian Language in the Army," Argumenty
ifakty, 1988, no. 35, in FBIS, September 7, 1988, p.86.
22D. T. Yazov Armiya druzhby i bratstva narodov, Krasnaya zvezda, September 22, 1989
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more than 5 or 6 different ethnic backgrounds, today they include up to 15 ethnic groups,
while soldiers of 34 ethnic groups serve in the Baltic fleet aviation.23 Poor knowledge of
Russian by conscripts from Central Asia and Transcaucasia impedes training and
achievement of technical proficiency by ship crews.24 An analysis of the award list of the
crew members of MIKE submarine (a trained eye can easily correlate last names and ethnic
origins in the Soviet Union) indicates that the VMF has to keep the Central Asian and
Transcaucasian conscripts from serving on their technologically more sophisticated ships:
out of 67 crew members, only one had a Moslem-sounding name—and he was a
Captain 1 st Rank, not an enlisted man; one Captain 2nd Rank had an Armenian name, one
enlisted man had a Georgian name and one enlisted man had a Lithuanian name; the rest all
had Slavic, predominantly Russian, names.25
As the navy has to rely more and more on non-Slavic conscripts, and as new ethnic
conflicts break into the open, VMF has discovered that it is unprepared to deal
effectively with the nationalities' problems. The predominantly Slavic officers,
including political officers, are unprepared for work with the ethnic sailor. They have no
knowledge of the history and culture of non-Russians, and they have not been trained to be
tactful with them. Officers have no inhibitions against humiliating seamen's ethnic pride.
For many officers, the ethnic and religious traditions of non-Slavic, especially Moslem
conscripts (such as the ban on eating pork, viewing cleaning jobs as unmanly) are simply to
be broken forcefully. This can lead to tragedies: in one case, a Moslem conscript had
refused to take off a religious charm until an officer tore it off the seaman's neck, after
which the conscript committed suicide.26
23 "v kubrike-vse respubliki" (Interview with Vice Admiral A. Kornienko), Krasnaya zvezda, April 2,
1988.
24Lt. Colonel G. Ivanov, "Mnogonatsional'nyy ekipazh: priobreteniya i poteri," Morskoy sbornik, 1988,
no. 11, p. 42.
25
"Ukaz Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR."
26Lt. Colonel G. Ivanov, "Mnogonatsional'nyy ekipazh: priobreteniya i poteri," Morskoy sbornik, 1988,
no. 11, pp. 41, 42.
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When mass nationalist demonstrations were held in Armenia in 1988, the typical-
and clumsy—reaction by navy officers was to single out Armenian conscripts for one-on-one
conversations with ships' political officers. To compound the tactlessness, sailors with
distinctly Armenian-sounding surnames were summoned to the political officers via ship
loudspeakers. According to an unfortunate Armenian participant, conversations were held
"in a mysterious atmosphere of a plot." After such conversations, the Armenian seamen
"felt curious or guarded stares behind their backs, unease of their crewmates," and began to
suspect "with horror" that they "were guilty for everything happening [in Armenia], and that
they "would not be trusted in certain situations."27
3. 4. Health Problems.
Besides demographic factors, the health problems of young males make manning
the VMF difficult. The VMF has to weigh two factors in assigning jobs to new conscripts:
their technical skills and their health. It turns out that while college students were called up
for active duty in the armed forces, including the VMF (1982—summer 1989 period), the
VMF frequently had to disregard their technical skills when assigning jobs, because of the
shortage of healthy conscripts fit for demanding duty such as submarine service.28
3. 4. An AH Volunteer Soviet Navy?
As stated earlier, the VMF C-in-C Fleet Admiral Chernavin indicated as early as
1988 that he saw the way out of the current predicament with navy conscripts in offering
211bid., p. 42.
28
"Kak pomoch' aspirantu," Krasnaya zvezda, September 20, 1988.
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"real benefits to seamen." But Chernavin's statement was poorly timed; later in 1988,
civilian intellectuals and middle-ranking military officers began a campaign for a volunteer
armed forces. The members of the Soviet high command, led by the Minister of Defense
Army General Dmitriy Yazov have emphatically rejected the idea as inappropriate for a
socialist state, unsuitable for modern warfare, and economically ruinous. Chernavin's idea,
although he did then not call for an all-volunteer navy, came dangerously close and was
probably seen by many in the High Command as only the first step down a slippery slope.
The Ministry of Defense, dominated by Ground Forces officers, chose to disregard
Adm. Chernavin's warning against reducing the length of conscription to a navy already
suffering from inadequately prepared conscripts, and instead began to prepare a set of
proposals to the Supreme Soviet to reduce the term of conscription to the navy down to two
years in order to reduce the public discontent about the length of naval service for
conscripts.29 For a period of time Adm. Chernavin stopped mentioning his idea in public.
This changed in the aftermath of the disastrous fire and sinking of MIKE, one of the Soviet
Union's most advanced attack nuclear submarines with a subsequent loss of most of her
crew in international waters in April 1989. The State Commission which investigated
the MIKE's sinking has tentatively proposed that submarines might be manned in
the future by commissioned and non-commissioned officers only, since it is too
difficult for enlisted men to learn all complexities of such ships during their term of
conscription. 30 This argument counters the standard criticism of volunteer enlisted men as
being too expensive-surely having ships run by officers and NCO's only would be no less
expensive!
Adm. Chernavin used this finding of the Commission to launch an offensive
promoting a volunteer navy. In an interview dealing with the first Soviet aircraft carrier
29Deputy Chief of General Staff of VS, Col. General G. Krivosheev, "O vseobshchnosti voinskoy
sluzhby," Krasnaya zvezda, August 31, 1989.
30R. Ignat'ev, "Prichiny gibeli podvodnoy lodki 'Komsomolets',", Izvestiya, August 6, 1989; Captain 3rd
Rank Yu. Gladkevich, "Pochemu pogibla podlodka 'Komsomolets'," Krasnaya zvezda . August 8, 1989.
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Tbilisi, Chernavin stated categorically that if the term of conscription is cut from three
down to two years, the navy would not be able to operate. He revealed that he had
submitted to the Minister of Defense a set of proposals for a volunteer navy.
His model, apparently, is the Royal Navy: Chernavin cited his recent visit (together with
the Minister of Defense Yazov) to Great Britain, where he was allegedly told that the royal
Navy finds and retains the best men "simply" by paying them more money than they would
be able to make anywhere else.31 Chernavin's proposal is bound to cause substantial
resistance from the other services: if implemented only in the navy, it would give the VMF
a great advantage over the other services in attracting the better conscripts, and might cut
into their budgets as well.
4.0 EDUCATION AND TRAINING.
4.1. Officers' Education.
Education of commissioned officers is one of the aspects of perestroika in the
VMF. The educational work carried out by VMF academies is supposed to be changed;
subject matter should be more closely related to the realities of the VMF
operations; students are to show more independent thinking and more give-and-
take between students and faculty should take place, while modern educational
technology (primarily computers) should help to usher in these changes. But the
process of change is obstructed by economic hardship and inertia. Take the
example of the Grechko Naval Academy in Leningrad, where middle-ranking VMF officers
are enrolled. Improved interaction between faculty and students is impossible because the
31 V. N. Chernavin, "Kommentariy Glavnokomanduyushchego Voenno-Morskim Flotom strany admirala
flota V. N. Chernavina ," Pravda Octoberl9, 1989.
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classes are so large that "a teacher cannot even remember the names of his students, let
alone have "individual contacts" with them. Obviously the current economic and fiscal
crunch does not allow the assignment of more officers to teaching jobs; the same factor is
apparently responsible for reduction in the course of education at the Naval Academy from
three to two years ( in reality, down to 22 months): the students are literally forced by
command to spend every night at the Academy, but the quality of education has suffered.
The academy receives only one copy of exercise reports from the fleets; since there is no
copier, only one student gets to read it and then share his impressions with the others.32
The Grechko Naval Academy is equipped with computers~but they are frequently
idle because there are no floppy disks for them. Personnel at the Academy also feel that the
Ministry of Defense treats their institution worse than its Ground Forces counterpart, the
Frunze Academy in Moscow, in the all-important issue of housing.33 An additional
problem in officers' education is presented by an alleged lack of objectivity in selecting
candidates to service academies: in absence of admission tests, too much role is played by
family connections of candidates.34 As a result, the quality and prestige of academy
education~the most important in the Soviet navy-suffer.
4.2. Training and Exercises.
Deficiencies of personnel and education are magnified by traditional shortcomings
in training and exercises: lack of realism, excessive caution and resulting
oversimplification, attributed by Commander of the Pacific Fleet Admiral G. Khvatov to
32Turchenko, 'Test' u akademii i takie zaboty."
33Ibid.
34Deputy Commander of the Higher Naval Engineering School named after V. I. Lenin Captain 1st Rank
A. Bobrakov, ""Shinel'nyy' printsip," Krasnaya zvezda, January 1, 1989.
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the universal bureaucratic fear of acknowledging problems.35 Adm. Khvatov is working
to improve training in the Pacific Fleet. Commanders of groups of ships
(soyedineniye) are to evaluate their ships' performance in training without reporting it up
the chain of command; only formal tests taken under command of superior officers would
be graded; skippers are to plan their ships' training routine on their own on the basis of the
real strengths and shortcomings of their crews; then they would be responsible for passing
(or failing) their test without passing the buck to their superiors.
Adm. Khvatov also proposes a wholesale change in evaluating ships' readiness.
Instead of using a single factor of hitting the target, ship's performance should be evaluated
on the basis of the "realities of today's combat": timely detection, location and targeting,
preemption of the enemy in preparation and launching of a strike, and only then-the
strike's accuracy, because measuring the latter factor without taking the two former ones
into consideration is "senseless." A similar approach, according to Adm. Khvatov, was
used by VMF ships in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf; readiness was evaluated in
the course of exercises with a tactical situation very much like combat.36
The psychological and organizational obstacles to such a change are
considerable, as amply illustrated in Krasnaya zvezda, the Ministry of Defense daily,
only five days after Adm. Khvatov's statement. When a submarine in Adm. Khvatov's
Pacific Fleet was recently assigned a new training task, it failed the test due to the usual
factors: the Pacific Fleet Directorate of Combat Training sent a host of its representative on
board, who literally took over the command of the ship; a newly assigned executive officer
had little experience of sea duty; practically every day of the training period up to fifty
35Commander of the Pacific Fleet Admiral G. Khvatov, "Logika uproshcheniya," ("The logic of
simplification."), Krasnaya zvezda, February 16, 1989.
36Ibid.
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percent of the crew were involved in other activities (usually these include construction and
cleaning work, repairs to buildings and grounds, etc.).37
Some VMF commentators also note that there is a good reason for
constraining the independence of commanding officers; while technology is
becoming increasingly complex, many commanding officers are young, with 33-34 years
old officers in command of major ships not being exceptional cases.38 This is a
result of a policy swing from the extreme of personnel "stagnation" to the extreme of
rejuvenation.39 For instance, Captain 1st Rank Ye. Vanin, the late skipper of the
"experimental" (that is, especially important and technologically complex) MIKE submarine
which sank in April 1989, was 41 years old; besides him, there were two other
Captains 1st Rank on board, one of them—deputy commander of the submarine
squadron and "the senior officer" on board.40
Economic constraints are exerting pressure upon training in the VMF. Everything—
ships and equipment, fuel, electrical power, food and uniforms—are becoming more
expensive, and therefore the cost of one hour of training of VMF ships and aircraft is
becoming more expensive.41 To alleviate the problem, the Chief of VMF Combat
Training, Vice Admiral A. Kuz'min, has enthusiastically endorsed wider use of
computer simulators and indicated that the VMF intends to install computer simulators
on board ships right next to actual controls in order to conduct realistic training without
actually using ships' mechanisms.42 A Senior Officer of the Main Naval Staff proposes a
37Captain 1st Rank V. Shirokov, Captain 2nd Rank S. Turchenko, "Yeshche dovleyut starye podkhody,"
("Old methods are still predominant."), Krasnaya zvezda, February 21, 1989.
38Captain 3rd Rank P. Ishchenko, "Kto khozyain na korable," Krasnaya zvezda, December 1, 1988.
39Captain 1st Rank A. Bobrakov, ""Shinel'nyy' printsip," ("The great coat principle."), Krasnaya zvezda,
January 1, 1989.
40Captain 3rd Rank P. Ishchenko, "Komandir ukhodit poslednim," Krasnaya zvezda, April 19, 1989; "Ukaz
Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR. O nagrazhdenii ordenom Krasnogo Znameni chlenov ekipazha
podvodnoy lodki 'Komsomolets'," Krasnaya zvezda, May 13, 1989.
41 Senior Officer of the Main Staff of VMF, Captain 1st Rank A. Shevchenko, "Den'gi v trubu," Krasnaya
zvezda, January 21, 1989.
42Chief of VMF Combat Training Vice Admiral A. Kuz'min, "Nuzhny tvortsy, a ne remeslenniki,"
Krasnaya zvezda, January 17, 1989.
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different organization of ship training with an emphasis on "parallel and
simultaneous" work on several training tasks by a group of several ships instead of
the established practice of a single ship putting out to sea in order to work on only one
training task; the number of various training tasks may also be reduced.43
Increased emphasis on computer simulators is not viewed with equal optimism by
all navy officers. A Senior Officer of the VMF Main Staff, Captain 1st Rank A.
Shevchenko, expressed concern that too much emphasis on simulators might result in
the crews forgetting how to operate real equipment. While plans for computerized
training are being made by the VMF command, officers aboard ships are suffering from
computer illiteracy because of a virtual lack of personal computers. It appears that the VMF
has failed to come up with procurement requirements for personal computers (which are by
far too expensive for individual officers to buy), and is justifying its non-procurement
policy by guidelines issued 14 or even 24 years ago!44
Many commissioned officers apparently suffer from complacency regarding
improving their skills. A study based on the evidence from the 1960s- 1970s indicated that
many Soviet officers could not operate equipment under their command.45 There
has apparently been no progress in this area in the 1980s.46 Officers can improve
their skills by advancing through several levels ("classes") of technical skills, the 1st Class
being the top one. Several factors make this process less effective than desired. First of
all, moving up to the next skill level is not compulsory; without an up-or-out promotion
system, the less diligent officers have an option of not improving their technical skills.
Second, the requirements for upgrading one's skill level are unrealistically grandiose: not
only has an officer to learn operation of ALL equipment and mechanisms under his
43Shevchenko, "Den'gi v trubu."
^Captain 2nd Rank S. Turchenko, "O flagakh, komp'yuterakh, novykh korablyakh," Krasnaya zvezda,
January 27, 1989.
45Bathurst et al., The Soviet Sailor, pp. 11, 12.
46Rear Admiral V. Kurochkin, "O klassnosti ofitsera," Morskoy sbornik, 1988, no. 12, pp.29, 30.
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command, as well as understand their theory and know their maintenance and repair, but he
also has to be fully successful in Marxist-Leninist studies, and to ensure excellent
performance by his subordinates. Under such conditions, upgrading one's skill level all
too frequently becomes a formality, or is avoided by officers.47
5.0. QUALITY OF TECHNOLOGY.
Whatever the problems with the quality of navy personnel, the VMF blames the
increasingly frequent ship accidents on shipbuilding R&D and industry. The naval build-
up undertaken during Brezhnev's years in power might have too rapid for the shipbuilding
industry. VMF Fleet Admiral Ivan Kapitanets, First Deputy C-in-C, says that after the
mid-1960s so many military and civilian R&D and shipbuilding organizations have begun
to take part in naval platform construction and weapons acquisition that it has become
exceedingly difficult to find any one individual responsible for technological failures,
which has resulted in lax attitudes.48 This should be of special concern to the VMF
command and to the Soviet political leadership, since Gorbachev's new doctrine of quality
rather than quantity presupposes that better men would have better technology at their
disposal. (Some VMF experts believe that the navies of the near to mid-term future will be
armed by some truly revolutionary weapons.)49
47
Ibid., p.30.
48Captain 2nd Rank S. Turchenko, "Kak razvivat'sya flotu," Krasnaya zvezda, August 15, 1989.
4yNikolay Vyunenko et al., Voenno-morskoy flot: rol', perspektivy razvitiya, ispol'zovanie (Moscow:
Voenizdat, 1987), pp. 98-101.
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5.1. Problems of Reliability.
The VMF command must be concerned about the military R&D and industry's
capability to make such future technologies reliable, since the increasingly complex
weapons systems of the 1970s and 1980s have suffered from poor reliability. While new
Soviet weapons and weapons systems have "unquestionably high tactical-
technical characteristics," their reliability remains a source of special concern to
the navy.50 For instance, artillery radar on guided missile cruiser Vitse Admiral Drozd
has to be adjusted and serviced by the manufacturer's representatives before practically
every cruise. Similar problems are encountered on much newer ships: for instance, the
system for communicating with aircraft at the Kiev-class VSTOL carrier Baku is
unusable.51 The State Commission investigating the MIKE disaster found a large number
of technological problems in its design.52 MIKE was not one of the newest VMF
submarines: according to Adm. Chernavin, it was designed in the 1960s, and most of its
equipment was not the latest.53 But according to two reserve submariners, MIKE was
hardly an exception; it is impossible to imagine, they say,
an underwater cruise without a fire or a breakdown nearly
every day. This is not a cruise—it is a madhouse. This is the
kind of nuclear submarines they build for us...54
50Ishchenko, "Korabli i rubli."
5 Captain 3rd Rank P. Ishchenko, "Korabli i rubli," Krasnaya zvezda, May 12, 1989.
52Gladkevich, "Pochemu pogibla podlodka 'Komsomolets'".
53Captain 1st Rank A. Bystrov, "Gibel' 'Komsomol'tsa': real'nost' i domysly," Krasnaya zvezda, May 13,
1989.
54A. Gorbachev, I. Kolton, "SOS, kotorogo ne bylo."
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5.2. VMF and Defense Industry: A Souring Relationship.
In the relatively recent past, the navy was able to acquire adequate quality
hardware thanks to the VMF's ability to pressure the shipbuilding and other
defense industries into fulfilling the navy's requirements. Such pressure was exerted
through the officials of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in charge of the
defense industry, and through the presence of voenpredy—m&itary representatives-who had
the freedom to defend the interests of the monopoly customer even to the point of shutting
down production lines and leaving industrial enterprises without pay if substandard
products were shipped.
This system no longer works. During the Brezhnev years, when bureaucratic
agencies were allowed to pursue their self-interest with little restraint exercised by the
political leadership, the main VMF contractors managed to obtain from the Council of
Ministers permission to supply the VMF, "as an exception," with hardware
accepted without complete testing, on approval of suppliers themselves. This
"exception" has turned out to be as high as thirty percent of total production for VMF for
some suppliers. 55
Historically, the Soviet navy had to accept ships which had not completely passed
acceptance tests: in the immediate pre-World War II period the shipbuilding industry turned
out ships which the navy refused to accept, but nevertheless, for lack of any alternative, had
to operate while negotiating with the industry via the offices of the top political leadership on
settlement of their differences.56 However irritating to the navy, this was not a major
defense problem given the minor role subsequently played by the Soviet navy in World War
II. Moreover, the strong although erratic and brutal political leadership of Stalin frequently
55Captain 2nd Rank S. Turchenko, "Vedomstvennyy diktat," Krasnaya zvezda, June 30, 1989.
56Mikhail Tsypkin, The Origins of Soviet Military Research and Development system: (1917-1941)
System (Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1985), p. 145.
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helped to solve the differences between the military and the defense industry through active
involvement in minor details of weapons acquisition-something the Brezhnev generation of
leaders was incapable of doing because of its preference for not fighting against major
bureaucratic interests, and because the technological complexity of weapons has increased
immensely since Stalin's days and has made political intervention more difficult
The case of the MIKE disaster appears to confirm that the VMF has lost some of its
ability to enforce quality in the shipbuilding industry. The state commission which
investigated the MIKE sinking has concluded that the submarine's acceptance tests suffered
from "impermissible liberalism," and that in the future the system of acceptance tests should
be made more strict.57 In the meantime the VMF has to pay teams of engineers and
repairmen from the industry who are needed to operate and maintain ships. A reporter for
the Ministry of Defense daily saw, during his recent visit to "one of the nuclear-powered
cruisers," more civilians than sailors on board, and was told that the number of industry
representatives on board was in the hundreds! 58
There appear to be two different approaches to improving the situation. Today the
voenpredy—military representatives-monitor only the the quality of the final product, which
means that deficiencies are discovered already at the testing stage when correcting them is
sometimes hopelessly expensive, and the VMF finds itself in the position where it has to
accept whatever is offered and hope that some of the problems will be fixed by the industry
later. One possible solution is to make the voenpredy [military representatives]
monitor virtually every step of the R&D and production process. 59 Such a
measure, however, is impractical because a) the immense complexity of modem weapons
would require an unrealistically large number of highly trained navy officers, and b) it
would slow down the already slow process of weapons acquisition.
57
"Pochemu pogibla podlodka 'Komsomolets';" Ignat'ev, "Prichiny gibeli podvodnoy lodki
'Komsomolets'."
58Ishchenko, "Korabli i rubli."
59lbid.
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The second possible solution is to reduce the number of classes of ships and
of ships built, and to use the released resources for improving the quality of
equipment, perhaps by organizing competitions between various R&D and production
facilities in order to eliminate the monopolism among VMF suppliers.60 This approach is
fully compatible with Gorbachev's doctrine of quality rather than quantity, with Soviet
unilateral cuts of older ships, and with Soviet pressure for conventional arms control with
the United States.
6. 0. CONCLUSIONS.
Why such a bleak picture of the Soviet navy? Is this analysis, based on what the
Soviets say about themselves today, fair? Does it reflect the reality? On the one hand, a
cultural factor might be at work here: the Russians tend, just like the characters of their
great nineteenth century writer Dostoevsky, to have wild mood swings from elation to
despair, from the height of imperial self-confidence that produced the 1976 decision to
build "real" aircraft carriers to today's self-dejection. After all, the Soviet navy is
continuing to operate—and therefore it must have at least a core of adequately qualified
officers and men, and at least marginally reliable ships.
On the other hand, it is hardly possible that the navy is in much better shape than
the Soviet society at large, which undeniably is in a crisis. The navy ignored existing
problems for years under Brezhnev, and now has to deal with them all at once. Man-made
disasters in the Soviet Union (from Chernobyl to the natural gas explosion which killed
nearly a thousand people in June 1989) seem to be a sign of increasing entropy, and over
the last several years they have been paralleled by naval accidents. Recently it was rumored
60Ibid.; Kapitanets, "Kak razvivat'sya flotu?"
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that a mutiny broke out on the Kirov guided missile cruiser in the North Fleet; the Soviets
themselves are apparently expecting more bad things to happen, and such a mood is
perhaps as important for policy as the real problems of the VMF.
The most obvious way out of the current problems with manpower and materiel is
to reduce the number of men and ships in the Soviet navy. The cuts of older ships and
some personnel confirm that the Soviets understand this. The idea that numbers of ships
by themselves do not make a navy, that without adequate human and material resources no
navy would be an effective "combat system," is now popular with at least some Soviet
naval officers. 61 Further cuts would allow the Soviets to improve the condition of their
naval officer corps, to find either enough good conscripts for the navy or pay volunteers to
enlist, and to build, to use Lenin's old formula, "fewer, but better" ships-provided that a
certain minimum of political and economic stability is preserved in the Soviet Union in the
near to mid-term future.
61 See, for instance, Vice Adm. R. Golosov, Captain 1st Rank V. Koryavko, Captain 1st Rank E.
Shevelev, "Nekotorye uroki iz istorii sozdaniya otechestvennogo flota," ("Some lessons of the history of
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